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Summary
Under current law, taxpayers who itemize deduc-
tions may deduct the amount they donate to charities 
from their adjusted gross income (AGI) when determin-
ing how much they owe in federal income taxes. That 
deduction gives people who itemize an incentive to con-
tribute to charities. Like other forms of preferential tax 
treatment, the deduction also costs the federal govern-
ment revenues that it might otherwise collect. At current 
levels of charitable giving, the cost of that deduction—
measured as the additional revenues that could be col-
lected if the deduction was eliminated—will total about 
$230 billion between 2010 and 2014, according to the 
Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT).1 
Numerous proposals have been made in recent years to 
alter the income tax treatment of charitable giving by 
individual donors. Some proposals aim to reduce the 
cost to the government by imposing a floor (or minimum 
level) that a person’s charitable giving would have to 
exceed to qualify for preferential tax treatment. Other 
proposals would extend the current charitable deduction 
to taxpayers who do not itemize deductions or would 
replace the current deduction with a nonrefundable tax 
credit available to all taxpayers who make charitable 
contributions.2 
For this analysis, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
examined how much taxpayers in various income groups 
donate to charities and what types of organizations 
receive those donations. CBO also investigated how 
changing the structure of tax incentives for giving would 
affect the tax subsidy (the cost in forgone revenues to 
the federal government), the overall level of charitable 
giving, and the extent to which different income groups 
benefit from the tax preference. Specifically, CBO looked 
at 11 options for altering the current income tax treat-
ment of charitable giving, which can be grouped into 
4 categories: 
 Retaining the current deduction for itemizers but 
adding a floor. 
 Allowing all taxpayers to claim the deduction, with or 
without a floor. 
 Replacing the deduction with a nonrefundable credit 
for all taxpayers, equal to 25 percent of a taxpayer’s 
charitable donations, with or without a floor. 
 Replacing the deduction with a nonrefundable credit 
for all taxpayers, equal to 15 percent of a taxpayer’s 
charitable donations, with or without a floor. 
For each of the four categories, CBO analyzed two 
potential floors: a fixed dollar amount ($500 for single 
taxpayers and $1,000 for couples filing a joint return) 
and a percentage of income (2 percent of AGI). Only 
contributions in excess of the floor would be deductible 
or eligible for a credit. The analysis uses data for 2006, 
the most recent year for which the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice’s public-use sample of individual income tax returns 
is available. The tax treatment of charitable contributions 
is generally the same today as it was in 2006; however, 
because of rising incomes and contribution amounts, the 
options that include a fixed dollar floor would have a 
somewhat different impact today than presented here.
1. A deduction for charitable contributions also exists under the cor-
porate income tax. JCT estimates a much smaller five-year cost for 
that deduction: about $17 billion. See Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2010–
2014, JCS-3-10 (December 15, 2010), www.jct.gov/publications 
.html?func=startdown&id=3718. 
2. Taxpayers can use tax credits to reduce their income tax liability 
(the amount they owe). Nonrefundable credits can lower income 
tax liability to zero, but excess credits cannot be used to increase 
tax refunds. In contrast, refundable credits that exceed income tax 
liability are paid to taxpayers as refunds.
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Effects of Policy Options on Tax 
Subsidies and Charitable Donations
According to CBO’s modeling, adding a contribution 
floor to any of the approaches listed above would reduce 
both the total federal tax subsidy and the total amount 
donated to charity, relative to the same option without a 
floor. In each case that CBO examined, the reduction in 
the subsidy (and thus the increase in revenues) would 
exceed the reduction in charitable contributions, whether 
measured in dollars or as a percentage change. The reason 
is that introducing a floor would continue to provide a 
tax incentive for additional giving above the level of the 
floor and at the same time reduce the tax subsidy for 
donations that people might have made even without a 
tax incentive.3 
Allowing all taxpayers to claim a deduction for charitable 
giving would have increased donations in 2006 by an 
estimated $2.0 billion (or 1 percent) and increased the 
total tax subsidy by $5.2 billion (or 13 percent) from the 
2006 amounts. Combining a deduction for all taxpayers 
with a floor, however, could both increase donations and 
decrease the tax subsidy. For example, such a deduction 
combined with a fixed dollar floor of $500/$1,000 would 
have increased donations by $800 million in 2006 and 
decreased the tax subsidy by $2.5 billion (see Summary 
Table 1).
Replacing the current deduction with a 25 percent tax 
credit would increase donations and also increase the gov-
ernment’s forgone revenues. Combining such a credit 
with certain contribution floors, however, could boost 
donations while reducing the tax subsidy or could 
decrease donations by a small percentage while reducing 
the tax subsidy by a large percentage. Setting the credit at 
15 percent would reduce donations but would reduce the 
tax subsidy by a larger amount (both in dollars and as a 
percentage change). 
Effects of Policy Options on 
Various Income Groups
Changing the tax treatment of charitable contributions 
would have differing effects on taxpayers at different 
points on the income scale. Adding a contribution floor 
to the current deduction for itemizers would reduce tax 
subsidies for all income groups, but for high-income 
taxpayers, the size of the reduction would vary signifi-
cantly depending on the type of floor used. For instance, 
augmenting the deduction with a fixed dollar floor of 
$500/$1,000 in 2006 would have lowered the tax subsidy 
for people with AGI over $100,000 by 0.08 percent of 
their AGI, whereas adding a floor equal to 2 percent of 
AGI would have lowered the tax subsidy for that income 
group by 0.30 percent of their AGI. 
Making the deduction for charitable contributions avail-
able to nonitemizers would benefit lower- and middle-
income taxpayers, who tend not to itemize deductions 
because their deductible expenses (such as mortgage 
interest and state and local taxes, as well as charitable 
donations) are not large enough to exceed the standard 
deduction. Those groups would benefit even more if the 
current deduction—which tends to help higher-income 
taxpayers more because they face higher tax rates—was 
replaced with a nonrefundable credit that gave all income 
groups the same tax incentives for giving. For example, 
replacing the deduction with a 25 percent credit in 2006 
would have increased the tax subsidy for taxpayers with 
AGI below $100,000 by 0.27 percent of their AGI, but it 
would have decreased the tax subsidy for people above 
that income level by 0.09 percent of AGI. Tax subsidies 
would be lower for all income groups with a 15 percent 
credit than with a 25 percent credit.
Caveats About This Analysis
The results of CBO’s policy simulations are meant to 
highlight the general effects of the various approaches. 
The exact size of those effects, however, would depend on 
the specific parameters of a policy—such as the level of 
the floor or the amount of the credit—as well as on the 
extent to which taxpayers would change the amount of 
their charitable giving in response to a change in the tax 
subsidy. In addition, this analysis does not reflect many of 
the other ways in which taxpayers might respond to a 
change in their tax subsidy, such as shifting donations 
between years. (In the appendix, CBO examines how 
sensitive the results of this study are to several different 
assumptions, including variations in taxpayers’ respon-
siveness to changes in their tax subsidy and the possibility 
of shifts in the timing of donations.)
3. The fact that some nonitemizers contribute to charities despite 
receiving no tax benefits for doing so suggests that a substantial 
amount of charitable giving would still occur in the absence of a 
tax incentive.
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Summary Table 1.
Summary of Total Donations and Tax Subsidies Under Current Law and 
Eleven Policy Options, 2006
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: The simulation results are for tax year 2006, and all figures are at 2006 levels. 
$500/$1,000 = $500 for individual filers and $1,000 for joint filers; AGI = adjusted gross income.
Floor for
Eligible Donations
No floor 203.0 40.9
$500/$1,000 -0.5 -5.5
2 percent of AGI -3.0 -15.7
No floor 2.0 5.2
$500/$1,000 0.8 -2.5
2 percent of AGI -1.9 -13.1
No floor 2.7 7.1
$500/$1,000 1.5 -2.4
2 percent of AGI -1.0 -11.9
No floor -7.8 -13.3
$500/$1,000 -8.6 -19.0
2 percent of AGI -10.0 -24.6
Add Floor
Total Contributions Tax Subsidy
(Billions of (Billions of 
2006 dollars) 2006 dollars)
Current Law
Deduction Available Only to Itemizers
Change from Current Law
Keep Deduction Available Only to Itemizers but
Convert Deduction to 15 Percent Nonrefundable 
Option 1
Option 2
Extend Deduction to All Filers
Option 3
Option 4
Option 5
Convert Deduction to 25 Percent Nonrefundable 
Credit for All Filers
Option 6
Option 7
Option 8
Credit for All Filers
Option 9
Option 10
Option 11
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Options for Changing the 
Tax Treatment of Charitable Giving
Introduction 
Taxpayers who itemize deductions on their federal 
income tax returns can reduce their tax liability by 
deducting their donations to qualified nonprofit organi-
zations—including organizations dedicated to religious, 
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes. 
Both monetary contributions and the value of donated 
financial assets or other property are deductible, subject 
to certain annual limits (see Box 1). The tax treatment of 
charitable giving, which has evolved over time, provides 
various incentives for donations.
Although corporations can also deduct their charitable 
donations, this analysis focuses on contributions by indi-
vidual donors. The study examines patterns of individual 
charitable giving and finds that the majority of such giv-
ing comes from a small number of taxpayers with high 
incomes. The study also reviews concerns about the cur-
rent tax treatment of giving and assesses how various 
changes to that treatment would affect the amount of 
donations made, the tax subsidies for them, and the 
distribution of those subsidies by income group.
History of Tax Incentives for Charitable Giving 
The deduction for charitable donations is a long-standing 
feature of the individual income tax: It was created in 
1917, just four years after the modern income tax began.1 
The amount of charitable contributions that could be 
deducted was initially capped at 15 percent of a taxpayer’s 
income. In general, the deduction applied only to high-
income people, because they were the only ones required 
to pay the income tax in its early years. 
During World War II, as the income tax expanded to 
cover three-quarters of the U.S. population, the standard 
deduction was introduced as an option for taxpayers.2 
The deductibility of charitable contributions was then 
limited to taxpayers who chose to itemize deductions for 
specific expenses they had incurred rather than claim the 
standard deduction. (In determining the initial size of the 
standard deduction, officials took into account a certain 
typical amount of charitable contributions.)3 
Nonitemizers were allowed to deduct their charitable 
contributions for a brief period during the 1980s. The 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 created a temporary 
“above-the-line” charitable deduction, permitting tax-
payers who opted for the standard deduction to also 
deduct charitable contributions.4 That provision was 
gradually phased in starting in 1982 and took full effect 
for 1986, after which it was allowed to expire.
Besides making charitable contributions during their life-
time, people can bequeath donations to charities from 
their estates upon their death. Such bequests, although 
not the focus of this analysis, can be deducted when 
1. The charitable deduction was enacted in the War Revenue Act 
of 1917. 
2. The standard deduction makes tax filing simpler because tax-
payers do not need to keep track of all of their itemized expenses. 
(Besides charitable donations, major expenses that can be 
deducted include mortgage interest, state and local taxes, and 
medical costs that exceed a certain percentage of a taxpayer’s 
adjusted gross income.) In addition, the standard deduction low-
ers the tax burden for taxpayers who have small amounts of item-
izable deductions. For 2011, the standard deduction is $5,800 
for single filers, $11,600 for joint filers, and $8,500 for heads of 
households. 
3. See the statement of Congressman Willis A. Robertson, Congres-
sional Record, vol. 90, 78th Cong., 2nd sess. (1944), p. 3973. 
4. From 1982 to 1984, the deduction was capped at between $50 
and $300. For 1985 and 1986, the cap was removed; instead, 
nonitemizers could deduct 50 percent of their charitable contribu-
tions in 1985 and 100 percent of their charitable contributions in 
1986.
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determining estate taxes.5 Charitable giving during one’s 
lifetime has advantages over bequests, however, because it 
can decrease individual income taxes now as well as estate 
taxes later (by reducing the size of the estate that is left) 
rather than just decreasing estate taxes.6
How Tax Incentives Affect Giving
By allowing itemizers to deduct their donations, the 
government indirectly subsidizes charitable activities. For 
example, someone in the 25 percent tax bracket faces an 
after-tax price of only 75 cents when giving a dollar to 
charity. In other words, a person in that bracket who 
donates $1 to charity has his or her taxes reduced by 
25 cents, so his or her consumption and savings decline 
by just 75 cents. In general, the deduction lowers the 
after-tax price per dollar of charitable contributions from 
$1 to $1 multiplied by the difference between one and 
the marginal tax rate.
Although the underlying motives for charitable giving 
are complex and not fully understood by economists, 
empirical studies generally find that taxpayers respond to 
the after-tax price of giving to some degree. Such tax 
incentives are limited, however, to the subset of taxpayers 
who itemize, and they favor high-income people, who 
face relatively higher marginal tax rates. That situation 
raises several questions: Could tax subsidies for charitable 
giving be extended to more taxpayers without costing the 
federal government large amounts of forgone revenue? 
Could the subsidies per dollar of giving be made equal for 
taxpayers across the income distribution? This study 
examines how policy options to address those questions 
would affect donations, revenue costs, and the distribu-
tion of tax benefits.
Patterns of Individual 
Charitable Giving
Donations by individuals make up the majority of 
contributions to U.S. charities. According to the Center 
on Philanthropy at Indiana University, U.S. charities 
received a total of $304 billion in contributions in 2009 
(equal to 2.2 percent of gross domestic product that 
year).7 Of that amount, $227 billion, or approximately 
Box 1.
Current-Law Limits on the Deduction for Charitable Contributions
Under current law, deductions for cash donations 
may not exceed 50 percent of a taxpayer’s adjusted 
gross income (AGI). Deductions for donated prop-
erty that has appreciated in value since it was initially 
acquired are generally limited to 30 percent of AGI. 
Although donations of appreciated property are sub-
ject to a lower percentage cap, to the extent that they 
fall below the cap, they receive more-favorable tax 
treatment than cash contributions do. The reason is 
that taxpayers do not have to pay income tax on capi-
tal gains from appreciated property that they donate, 
even though they can claim the fully appreciated 
value as a deduction. Deductions that are limited by 
those percentage-of-income caps can be claimed in 
future years (as long as total deductions in those years 
remain below the caps).
Beginning in 2013, with the expiration of the Tax 
Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, 
and Job Creation Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-312), 
high-income taxpayers will be subject to an addi-
tional limit on deducting charitable contributions. 
At that point, if a taxpayer’s AGI exceeds a specific 
threshold, total itemized deductions will be reduced 
by 3 percent of the income above that threshold (with 
the total reduction limited to 80 percent of the sum 
of certain deductions). Because that limit is based on 
the amount of income above the threshold, not on 
the amount of itemized deductions, it will not affect 
a taxpayer’s marginal incentive to give an additional 
dollar to charity.
5. See Congressional Budget Office, The Estate Tax and Charitable 
Giving (July 2004).
6. That statement is based on the assumption that earnings and 
consumption behavior are not affected by whether donations 
are made before or after death.
7. See Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, Giving USA 
2010: The Annual Report on Philanthropy for Year 2009 (Chicago: 
Giving USA Foundation, 2010).
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75 percent, was donated by individuals. The other 
25 percent came from foundations, corporations, and 
estates (bequests).
Trends in Donations over Time
From the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, individual giving 
rose steadily, even after accounting for inflation. Over the 
following five years, such giving soared, growing by more 
than 60 percent between 1995 and 2000 (see Figure 1). 
That surge was probably tied closely to gains in the 
stock market. As the stock market declined after 2000, 
inflation-adjusted individual giving fell by 4 percent in 
2001 and stagnated through 2003, before increasing by 
more than 13 percent between 2003 and 2007. With the 
recession and renewed decline in the stock market that 
began in late 2007, inflation-adjusted individual giving 
declined by almost 4 percent in 2008 and stayed flat in 
2009.
Among people who filed tax returns, charitable giving 
averaged about 2.5 percent of income in 2008 (the latest 
year for which such information is available). That figure 
includes itemizers who deducted charitable donations as 
well as nonitemizers, whose charitable giving was esti-
mated by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on the 
basis of surveys in which people report their contribu-
tions to charity. Giving as a share of income was fairly 
similar for most income groups in 2008, except for the 
highest-income taxpayers. Among people reporting more 
than $500,000 in adjusted gross income (AGI) that year, 
charitable giving averaged about 3.4 percent of income 
(see Figure 2 on page 4).8 
Higher-income households account for a significant 
portion of individual giving. People who reported AGI 
of at least $100,000 in 2008 were responsible for about 
58 percent of charitable giving by taxpayers, although 
they made up less than 13 percent of tax filers (see Table 
1 on page 5). At the top of the income scale, less than 1 
percent of taxpayers had AGI over $500,000, but they 
made 24 percent of the total charitable contributions by 
taxpayers in that year. 
Recipients of Donations
Data from tax returns do not identify the different orga-
nizations to which individuals make donations.9 Instead,
Figure 1.
Total Charitable Contributions by 
Individual Donors, 1963 to 2009 
(Billions of 2009 dollars)
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the 
Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, Giving USA 
2010: The Annual Report on Philanthropy for Year 2009 
(Chicago: Giving USA Foundation, 2010).
researchers in one study examined patterns of household 
giving using surveys by the University of Michigan and 
Bank of America.10 They found that, in general, the 
higher a household’s income, the smaller the share of 
donations that went to religious causes and the larger the 
share that went to causes related to health, education, and 
the arts. For example, among households with AGI below 
$100,000, 67 percent of giving was directed toward reli-
gious organizations, and only 7 percent went to institu-
tions that focus on health, education, or the arts (see Fig-
ure 3 on page 6). Among households that reported at 
least $1 million in income, the situation was reversed: 
8. For itemizers, giving as a share of income is U-shaped: The giving 
rates at both ends of the income distribution are higher than those 
in the middle.
9. The recipient organization is sometimes reported for donations by 
itemizers, but even in those cases, the fact that many organizations 
serve multiple functions makes it difficult to categorize the contri-
butions by type of recipient. 
10. See Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, Patterns of 
Household Charitable Giving by Income Group, 2005 (Indianapolis: 
Indiana University–Purdue University, 2007). In that study, 
estimates of giving by households with annual income below 
$200,000 were based on the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study, 
a module of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics conducted by 
the University of Michigan. Estimates for households with annual 
income above $200,000 were based on data from Bank of Amer-
ica’s Study of High Net Worth Philanthropy.
1963 1972 1981 1990 1999 2008
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Figure 2.
Percentage of Income That Tax Filers Contribute to Charity, by 
Income Group, 2008 
(Percentage of adjusted gross income)
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Division, Individual Income Tax 
Returns 2008 (revised July 2010); the Federal Reserve Board’s 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances; and the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics’ 2002 Consumer Expenditure Survey.
Note: Includes CBO’s estimates of charitable contributions by people who filed income tax returns in 2008 but did not itemize deductions.
Just 17 percent of donations were made to religious orga-
nizations, and 65 percent were made to support health-, 
education-, or arts-related activities. 
Concerns About the Current Tax 
Treatment of Charitable Giving
The present income tax treatment of charitable giving 
subsidizes certain taxpayers’ donations to charitable orga-
nizations and activities. Although those donations are 
generally seen as benefiting all of society, concerns have 
been raised about the current structure of the federal 
subsidy—in terms of the amount of forgone tax revenues, 
the incentives for donating, and the degree to which 
taxpayers respond to those incentives.
Cost to the Government of Subsidizing 
Charitable Contributions
The revenue cost to the government of the charitable 
deduction is not obvious from the total dollars donated 
or deducted because the tax rate that would have applied 
to the income had it not been donated (the marginal tax 
rate) varies greatly among individuals. The marginal rate 
can even vary for the same person depending on how 
much he or she donates. One way to estimate the revenue 
loss from charitable contributions is to simulate the 
change in tax revenues that would result if there were no 
deduction for charitable contributions and compare that 
result with actual revenues using a microsimulation 
model that can calculate the difference in taxes from a 
representative sample of tax returns. Using that approach, 
CBO estimates that the tax subsidy associated with the 
charitable deduction totaled $40.9 billion for 2006.
The subsidy for charitable giving is concentrated among 
high-income taxpayers to an even greater extent than 
donations are (see Figure 4 on page 7). Although taxpay-
ers reporting adjusted gross income of at least $100,000 
accounted for 11 percent of tax returns and 57 percent of 
charitable contributions in 2006, they received 76 per-
cent of the tax subsidy associated with charitable deduc-
tions. In contrast, taxpayers reporting AGI of less than 
$50,000 filed 66 percent of returns, accounted for 
19 percent of charitable donations, and received 5 per-
cent of the tax subsidy for donations.11 The difference in 
Under
$50,000
$50,000 to 
$100,000
$100,000 to 
$200,000
$200,000 to 
$500,000
Over
$500,000
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
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Adjusted Gross Income
11. Those numbers include CBO’s estimates of charitable contribu-
tions by income tax filers who did not itemize deductions.
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Table 1.
Charitable Contributions, by Tax Filers’ Itemizing Status and 
Income Group, 2008
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Division, Individual Income Tax 
Returns 2008 (revised July 2010); the Federal Reserve Board’s 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances; and the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics’ 2002 Consumer Expenditure Survey.
a. Includes CBO’s estimates of charitable contributions by people who filed income tax returns in 2008 but did not itemize deductions. 
the tax subsidy occurs because higher-income people are 
more likely to itemize deductions (and thus to receive a 
tax subsidy for donations) and because higher-income 
people generally pay higher marginal tax rates and thus 
receive a larger subsidy (relative to other itemizers) per 
dollar of donation.
Incentives Created by the Charitable Deduction
By subsidizing charities through individual income tax 
deductions, the government leaves the choice about 
which charities are subsidized largely to taxpayers. In 
doing so, however, it makes no distinction about the 
extent to which different charitable services would be 
provided in the absence of the tax subsidy. A sufficiently 
generous tax incentive can cause even charitable activities 
with large social benefits to be provided beyond the point 
at which the benefits to society of allocating more 
resources to those activities are lower than the benefits of 
allocating the same resources to other activities.
Subsidizing charitable organizations through income tax 
deductions also means that the subsidy accrues only to 
people who have income tax liability and itemize deduc-
tions and that the after-tax price of giving decreases with 
the donor’s marginal tax rate. Because people with higher 
income generally face higher marginal tax rates, they are 
subsidized at a greater rate than lower-income taxpayers 
are. In 2008, 25 percent of tax filers (or about 35 million 
returns) faced a federal income tax rate of zero (see Table 
2 on page 8).12 For those filers, the deductibility of chari-
table contributions gave them no tax benefits and hence 
no tax incentive to donate. At the same time, the 5 per-
cent of filers who were in the 28 percent, 33 percent, or 
35 percent tax brackets faced a substantially lower price 
of giving than the 54 percent of filers who faced tax rates 
of 10 percent or 15 percent. Because the subsidy for a 
93 65 21 53 37 19
31 22 27 81 47 24
14 10 22 90 43 21
3 2 12 93 24 12
1 1 18 94 49 24___ ___ ___ ___ ___
Total 142 100 100 64 199 100
14 29 8 70 20 12
18 37 23 82 40 23
12 25 28 90 41 23
3 7 17 93 24 14
1 2 25 95 49 28__ ___ ___ ___ ___
Total 48 100 100 81 173 100
Adjusted Gross Income
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Charitable Share of 
Number of Contributions
dollars)a
Share of
Tax Returns
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All Filers
Tax Returns
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Itemizers
Under $50,000
$50,000 to $100,000
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$200,000 to $500,000
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12. Another 24 million potential tax filers were not required to file a 
return that year, generally because their income was below the 
filing thresholds.
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Figure 3.
How Donors Allocate Their Charitable Contributions, by Income Group and 
Type of Recipient, 2005 
(Percentage of donations)
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, Patterns of Household Charitable 
Giving by Income Group, 2005 (Indianapolis: Indiana University–Purdue University, 2007).
a. Combined purpose funds, such as the United Way, receive contributions and allocate them to many different types of charities.
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Figure 4.
Different Income Groups’ Shares of Total Contributions and the 
Total Tax Subsidy, 2006 
(Percent)
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
given amount of charitable donations increases along 
with income, the deduction for charitable donations 
reduces the degree to which the average income tax rate 
(taxes as a percentage of income) rises as income grows. 
Even so, the federal income tax and overall federal tax sys-
tem both remain progressive, in that high-income filers 
pay a much larger share of their income in taxes than 
lower-income groups do.13 
Only about one-third of tax filers itemize their deduc-
tions. The price of giving for the two-thirds who do not 
itemize (primarily people in the lower tax brackets) is 
not subsidized, and thus—like people facing an income 
tax rate of zero—they have no tax incentive to make 
donations. Of course, nonitemizers have the option of 
itemizing their deductions; they do not do so primarily 
because their total itemized deductions, including chari-
table donations, are less than the standard deduction. If 
people’s responsiveness to tax incentives increases with 
income, the approach of providing higher marginal 
incentives for charitable giving to higher-income tax-
payers stimulates more donations; however, there is little 
evidence that higher-income taxpayers are more respon-
sive to the after-tax price of giving than other taxpayers 
are.14 Nonetheless, the fact remains that the current sub-
sidy gives lower-income households less incentive to 
donate than it gives higher-income households.
Taxpayers’ Responses to the Income Tax 
Treatment of Giving
How taxpayers respond to the tax incentives for charita-
ble giving depends on their underlying motive for mak-
ing donations. Motivations for giving are complicated 
and not fully understood. With a purely private good 
(one whose full benefits accrue to the person bearing 
the full cost), both the motivation and the behavior it 
Under $50,000 $50,000 to $100,000 $100,000 to $200,000 $200,000 to $500,000 Over $500,000
0
20
40
60
80
Adjusted Gross Income
Tax Returns
Charitable Contributions
Tax Subsidy
13. For example, CBO estimated that, on average, households that 
were in the lowest one-fifth of the income distribution in 2007 
(as measured by household income) received more in tax credits 
than they paid in federal individual income taxes, whereas house-
holds in the highest one-fifth of the income scale paid federal 
income taxes that averaged 14 percent of their income. With all 
types of federal taxes included, households in the lowest one-fifth 
of the income scale paid less than 5 percent of their income in fed-
eral taxes, on average, whereas those in the highest one-fifth of the 
income scale paid about 25 percent of their income in federal 
taxes. See Congressional Budget Office, Average Federal Tax Rates 
in 2007 (June 2010).
14. Although the percentage of households that report making chari-
table contributions rises with income (see Table 1 on page 5), 
empirical studies offer inconclusive evidence about whether 
responsiveness to tax incentives differs significantly for households 
at different income levels.
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Table 2.
Tax Filers, by Highest Marginal Tax 
Rate, 2008
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Internal Revenue 
Service, Statistics of Income Division, Individual Income 
Tax Returns 2008 (revised July 2010).
Note: The statutory marginal tax rates shown here may not pre-
cisely correspond to the rates that apply to charitable deduc-
tions because they do not account for such factors as the 
alternative minimum tax, the earned income tax credit, or 
phaseouts for personal exemptions and itemized deductions. 
These rates reflect only federal income taxes; combined fed-
eral and state marginal income tax rates are higher. (Most 
state income taxes also allow a deduction for charitable 
contributions.)
engenders are straightforward: People buy the good 
because they receive benefits from it, and they keep 
buying more units of the good until the benefit (the 
value to them) of the next unit just equals the cost of the 
next unit. That is also broadly true for charitable giving, 
but measuring the benefit that donors receive is more 
complicated. 
Some giving is probably motivated by altruism: People 
receive satisfaction from knowing that others in society 
are helped. The satisfaction of the donor depends partly 
on the satisfaction of others, regardless of who is paying 
for the help that is given. In the altruistic view, a potential 
donor is just as pleased if a third party steps in and pro-
vides the contribution instead. Some giving, however, is 
motivated not only by pure altruism but also by the 
“warm glow” that some people feel when giving or help-
ing others—or from receiving public recognition for their 
good deeds.15 In that case, the donor’s self-satisfaction 
depends on believing that he or she played a role in (or is 
being recognized for) helping others. Still other giving is 
more analogous to a private good, with the benefits 
directly accruing in proportion to the size of the 
donation. Examples include gifts to college sports pro-
grams (often in exchange for preferential treatment in 
purchasing tickets to athletic events) and donations to art 
museums (which sometimes confer special benefits only 
for donors). 
Although those various motivations may prompt differ-
ent kinds of responses to incentives for charitable giving, 
empirical studies have generally found that the amount of 
giving is responsive to changes in the after-tax price of 
giving. That responsiveness can be measured by the price 
elasticity of charitable giving—the percentage change in 
donations associated with a 1 percent increase in the price 
of giving.
Policymakers are generally interested in the permanent 
effects of policy changes, so estimates of how various pol-
icy options would alter charitable giving must rely on 
elasticity estimates that distinguish between transitory 
shifts in giving and permanent responses to a policy 
change. For example, a taxpayer who faces a temporary 
fluctuation in income has an incentive to shift donations 
to years when income is temporarily high and thus the 
after-tax price of giving is low. Taxpayers may also change 
the timing of their donations in response to a pre-
announced change in tax law. The Tax Reform Act of 
1986, which sharply reduced marginal income tax rates 
for high-income taxpayers, offers a good example. Chari-
table giving by high-income taxpayers increased steeply in 
1986, possibly in anticipation of that law, which was 
enacted in October 1986 and gradually phased in 
between 1987 and 1988. Failing to address shifts in giv-
ing that result from income fluctuations or preannounced 
changes in tax law may cause an elasticity estimate to be 
biased upward (in absolute value).
Most studies that estimate the relationship between 
charitable giving and tax rates use data from tax returns. 
Among those studies, ones that distinguish between per-
manent and transitory responses to price variation have 
found mixed evidence about the permanent price elastic-
ity of giving. Elasticity estimates vary significantly as a 
result of differences in the underlying data and time 
periods studied and the different methods used to derive 
the estimates. For example, one prominent study that 
examined a panel data set covering 10 years estimated a 
15. See James Andreoni, “Impure Altruism and Donations to Public 
Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving,” Economic Journal, 
vol. 100, no. 401 (1990), pp. 464–477.
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permanent price elasticity of giving of -0.5 (meaning that 
a 1 percent increase in the price of giving would reduce 
donations by 0.5 percent).16 Another study that used an 
expanded version of the same data set but applied a dif-
ferent methodology reported elasticity estimates ranging 
from -0.8 to -1.3.17
Experimental methods offer another approach to esti-
mate the relationship between the price and level of 
charitable giving. For instance, researchers have studied 
how people alter the amount of their contributions in 
response to matching grants (conditional offers to match 
contributions at a specified rate). Researchers in one 
study conducted a field experiment on existing donors to 
a charitable organization and found that announcing the 
availability of a matching grant increased donations, 
although the level of contributions was not affected by 
differences in the matching rate announced.18 That study 
estimated an overall price elasticity of -0.3, lower than the 
estimates from the aforementioned studies that were 
based on tax data. Because the experiment was framed as 
a matching grant rather than a change in the after-tax 
price of giving, however, the result may not be directly 
applicable to policies involving changes in tax rates.
Effects of Policy Options to Alter the 
Tax Treatment of Charitable Giving
In recent years, numerous proposals have been made to 
change the tax incentives for charitable giving. Such 
changes could take various forms, which would have dif-
ferent impacts on the costs to the federal government, the 
amount of charitable giving, and the number and types of 
taxpayers who would benefit. To illustrate the effects of a 
range of possible changes, CBO has examined 11 stylized 
policy options. The most important characteristics of the 
options are whether the tax benefit includes a floor (or 
minimum amount of donations) below which contribu-
tions are not subsidized; whether it is restricted to itemiz-
ers or is available to all taxpayers; and whether it takes the 
form of a tax deduction or a credit. The options can be 
grouped into 4 sets according to those characteristics:
 Retaining the current deduction for itemizers but 
adding a floor. 
 Allowing all taxpayers to claim the deduction, with or 
without a floor. 
 Replacing the deduction with a nonrefundable credit 
for all taxpayers, equal to 25 percent of a taxpayer’s 
charitable donations, with or without a floor. 
 Replacing the deduction with a nonrefundable credit 
for all taxpayers, equal to 15 percent of a taxpayer’s 
charitable donations, with or without a floor. 
In each option with a floor, the minimum contribution 
level was specified to be either a fixed dollar amount 
($500 for people filing individually and $1,000 for 
couples filing a joint return) or a percentage of income 
(2 percent of AGI). Only the amount of a taxpayer’s total 
charitable donations that exceeded that floor would be 
deductible or eligible for a credit.
If the current deduction for itemizers was augmented 
with a floor, the deduction would continue to provide 
incentives for charitable giving but at a much lower sub-
sidy cost. The total amount of donations would decline, 
but the tax subsidy would decline by a much larger 
amount, CBO estimates. For example, a fixed dollar floor 
that allowed itemizers to deduct charitable giving in 
excess of $500 for individuals and $1,000 for joint filers 
would decrease annual donations by $0.5 billion relative 
to current law, CBO estimates, but would decrease the 
federal tax subsidy by $5.5 billion (see Table 3). Both of 
the reductions would be larger with a higher floor 
(whether the floor was specified in dollar terms or as a 
percentage of AGI). Those results would occur because 
most donations would come from taxpayers who gave 
amounts above the floor, and although the floor would 
reduce the subsidy that those taxpayers received, it would 
maintain their tax incentive to make an additional dollar 
of donations.
16. See William C. Randolph, “Dynamic Income, Progressive Taxes, 
and the Timing of Charitable Contributions,” Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 103, no. 4 (1995), pp. 709–738. 
17. See Gerald E. Auten, Sieg Holger, and Charles T. Clotfelter, 
“Charitable Giving, Income, and Taxes: An Analysis of Panel 
Data,” American Economic Review, vol. 92, no. 1 (2002), pp. 371–
382. Also see Jon Bakija and Bradley T. Heim, “How Does Chari-
table Giving Respond to Incentives and Income? New Estimates 
from Panel Data,” National Tax Journal (forthcoming), which 
assembled the same data set and two others and found similar 
results. 
18. See Dean Karlan and John A. List, “Does Price Matter in 
Charitable Giving? Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural Field 
Experiment,” American Economic Review, vol. 97, no. 5 (2007), 
pp. 1774–1793.
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Table 3.
Total Donations and Tax Subsidies Under Current Law and 
Eleven Policy Options, 2006
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: The simulation results are for tax year 2006, and all figures are at 2006 levels.
n.a. = not applicable; $500/$1,000 = $500 for individual filers and $1,000 for joint filers; AGI = adjusted gross income.
Extending the current deduction to all filers or making a 
relatively large nonrefundable tax credit available to all 
filers would have the opposite effect: increasing both 
donations and the tax subsidy. However, CBO’s analysis 
indicates that if either of those approaches was combined 
with a contribution floor, it would be possible to raise 
donations while simultaneously reducing the tax subsidy. 
For instance, combining a 25 percent tax credit with a 
$500/$1,000 floor would raise donations by $1.5 billion 
and boost federal revenues by $2.4 billion. Other floors 
set sufficiently low could be combined with a deduction 
or a 25 percent tax credit to achieve a similar result. 
If a much smaller credit for all filers, such as 15 percent, 
was combined with a floor, the effect on total donations 
and the total tax subsidy would be more like that of 
Floor for 
Eligible 
Donations
Deduction Available 
No floor 203.0 n.a. n.a. 40.9 n.a. n.a.
Keep Deduction Available
Only to Itemizers but 
Option 1 $500/$1,000 202.5 -0.5 -0.2 35.4 -5.5 -13.5
Option 2 2 percent of AGI 200.0 -3.0 -1.5 25.2 -15.7 -38.5
Extend Deduction to 
Option 3 No floor 205.0 2.0 1.0 46.1 5.2 12.8
Option 4 $500/$1,000 203.8 0.8 0.4 38.4 -2.5 -6.1
Option 5 2 percent of AGI 201.1 -1.9 -0.9 27.8 -13.1 -32.1
Convert Deduction to 
Option 6 No floor 205.7 2.7 1.3 48.0 7.1 17.4
Option 7 $500/$1,000 204.5 1.5 0.7 38.5 -2.4 -5.8
Option 8 2 percent of AGI 202.0 -1.0 -0.5 29.0 -11.9 -29.2
Convert Deduction to 
Option 9 No floor 195.2 -7.8 -3.9 27.6 -13.3 -32.6
Option 10 $500/$1,000 194.4 -8.6 -4.2 21.9 -19.0 -46.5
Option 11 2 percent of AGI 193.0 -10.0 -4.9 16.3 -24.6 -60.1
Add Floor
All Filers
25 Percent Nonrefundable
Credit for All Filers
15 Percent Nonrefundable
Credit for All Filers
Percent
Current Law
Only to Itemizers
Options to Change Current Law
(Billions of Billions of (Billions of Billions of
2006 dollars) Dollars Percent 2006 dollars) Dollars
Contributions Current-Law Level Tax Subsidy Current-Law Level
Change in Total Change in
Total Contributions from Tax Subsidy from
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adding a floor to the current deduction for itemizers: 
both lower donations and a lower tax subsidy, regardless 
of the range of values used for the floor. In proportional 
terms, the impact on donations would be far smaller than 
the impact on the tax subsidy. With a 15 percent credit 
and a $500/$1,000 floor, charitable contributions would 
decline by 4 percent ($8.6 billion), whereas the tax 
subsidy would decline by 47 percent ($19.0 billion).
The effects of the policy options on tax subsidies would 
also vary by income group. Nonitemizers, who are pri-
marily low- and middle-income taxpayers, would clearly 
gain from the options that extended tax benefits to them. 
Adding either type of floor to a policy option would 
reduce tax subsidies across the board (relative to the com-
parable option without a floor), but the implications for 
high-income taxpayers would vary significantly between a 
fixed dollar floor and a percentage-of-income floor. With 
a floor set at 2 percent of AGI, for instance, high-income 
taxpayers would find it harder to reach the minimum 
level of contributions required to obtain the tax benefit 
than they would with a fixed $500/$1,000 floor. 
CBO estimated the impact of the policy options using 
2006 tax data and assessed each option relative to the tax 
rules in effect for that year, which are largely the same as 
those in effect for 2011.19 (For details about how CBO 
produced the estimates, see Box 2.) In calculating an 
option’s impact on contributions, CBO assumed that 
charitable giving has a price elasticity of -0.5, meaning 
that a 1 percent increase in the after-tax price of giving 
reduces donations by 0.5 percent. Because empirical evi-
dence about the size of the elasticity is mixed, CBO also 
analyzed the options assuming a higher degree of respon-
siveness (an elasticity of -1.0) and assuming that charita-
ble contributions are not affected at all by the after-tax 
price of giving (an elasticity of 0). Those sensitivity 
analyses are discussed in the appendix. 
Options 1 and 2: Deduction for Itemizers, 
With a Floor
The first set of options would keep the current itemized 
deduction for charitable contributions but allow only 
contributions in excess of a floor to be deducted. A floor 
would remove the subsidy for smaller donations—most 
of which would probably be made even without a tax 
incentive—but it would maintain the marginal incentive 
to give for people making larger donations. Imposing a 
floor would lower contributions to some extent, because 
some taxpayers who now contribute less than the amount 
of the floor might reduce their donations. A floor could 
also make decisionmaking more complex for taxpayers 
and would provide an incentive for “lumpy” donations, 
in which people donate more in one year and nothing 
in other years in order to maximize their deductible 
contributions.20 
Options 1 and 2 would maintain the charitable deduc-
tion for itemizers but would introduce different types of 
floors: 
 Option 1 would let itemizers deduct the amount of 
their charitable donations in excess of $500 for 
individual filers and $1,000 for joint filers. 
 Option 2 would let itemizers deduct the amount of 
their charitable donations in excess of 2 percent of 
their AGI.
The tax benefits to itemizers would be less generous 
under Option 1 than under current law; thus, some 
itemizers would choose to take the standard deduction 
rather than continue to itemize their deductions.21 
Nonitemizers would be unaffected. For most filers—all 
nonitemizers plus itemizers who donate more than the 
amount of the floor—the after-tax price of the last dollar 
of giving would remain unchanged. However, taxpayers 
19. Tax law in both 2006 and 2011 contains the major provisions 
originally enacted in the Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2001 and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2003. The major difference between the two 
years in terms of the tax treatment of charitable giving is that 2006 
tax law reduced the total value of certain itemized deductions—
including the deduction for charitable contributions—for high-
income taxpayers, whereas 2011 law does not have such a 
reduction.
20. With a $500 floor, for example, a taxpayer who donated $1,000 in 
each of two years would be allowed to deduct a total of $1,000, 
whereas a taxpayer who donated $2,000 in one year and nothing 
the next year could deduct a total of $1,500. The possibility that 
taxpayers will change the timing of deductions in response to a 
floor is an important consideration in designing such a policy. 
That issue is explored in more detail in the appendix.
21. In general, the taxpayers who would no longer choose to itemize 
would be those for whom itemized deductions minus the lesser of 
their charitable contributions or $500 (for individuals) would be 
less than the standard deduction.
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Box 2.
The Basis for CBO’s Estimates
The analysis in this study is based on the Congres-
sional Budget Office’s (CBO’s) individual income 
tax model, which uses data for 2006. In the model, 
a sample representing all households in the United 
States is constructed by combining information from 
the Internal Revenue Service’s 2006 Statistics of 
Income public-use sample of individual income tax 
returns with information from the Census Bureau’s 
March 2007 Current Population Survey. For returns 
without itemized deductions, CBO estimated chari-
table contributions using surveys in which people 
report their charitable giving (the Federal Reserve’s 
2004 Survey of Consumer Finances for people giving 
over $500 and the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 2002 
Consumer Expenditure Survey for those giving less 
than $500). Taxes and tax rates were estimated using 
CBO’s tax calculator. All estimates are for tax year 
2006 and reflect the extent to which tax subsidies and 
charitable giving would have been different had a 
given option been in place in that year.
Calculating the Tax Subsidy for 
Charitable Contributions
This analysis estimates the cost of the tax preference 
for charitable donations by focusing on the change in 
revenues directly attributable to the level of charitable 
giving. That approach contrasts with the type of reve-
nue estimates that are the responsibility of the staff of 
the Joint Committee on Taxation. Such estimates 
would reflect many of the ways in which taxpayers 
might alter their behavior in response to the existence 
of the tax preference, such as changing the timing of 
donations between years and changing their tax com-
pliance. The measure that CBO used does not reflect 
all of the behavioral assumptions that would be 
included in a revenue estimate; it accounts only for 
changes in the amount of charitable giving and any 
changes in itemization status that would occur if the 
standard deduction was larger than a taxpayer’s non-
charitable itemized deductions. 
Although CBO’s measure incorporates fewer types of 
responses than a true revenue estimate, it is also less 
sensitive to the design details of an option. Thus, it is 
more suited to portraying the costs of highly stylized 
options such as the ones examined in this analysis. 
Removing the emphasis on design details makes it 
possible to identify the salient characteristics of 
broad approaches to changing the tax treatment of 
charitable contributions.
In this analysis, taxpayers were modeled as choosing 
to itemize deductions or claim the standard deduc-
tion under each policy option. The calculations 
assumed that taxpayers would maximize the amount 
of their total deductions. Thus, for example, if the 
deduction for charitable contributions was extended 
to nonitemizers, some taxpayers who had been item-
izers would switch to being nonitemizers if that pol-
icy change lowered their total tax bill. The cost of 
subsidizing charitable giving under current law and 
the policy options was calculated by comparing the 
amount of income tax owed under a given policy 
with the amount that would be owed if there was no 
deduction for charitable contributions.
For options that include a floor, only the portion of a 
taxpayer’s contributions above that minimum level 
would be eligible for a deduction or a credit. For 
example, under an option with a fixed-dollar floor of 
$500 for individual filers and $1,000 for joint filers, a 
couple who itemized their deductions and donated 
$1,500 to charity would be able to claim only $500 
in donations as an itemized deduction on their 
return, and a couple who itemized and donated $750 
would not be able to deduct any of their donations.
Estimating the Effects of Policy 
Options on Giving
To evaluate the impact of each option, CBO esti-
mated how much taxpayers would change the 
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Box 2. Continued
The Basis for CBO’s Estimates
Tax Subsidies Under Current Law, by Income Group, 2006
(Percentage of adjusted gross income)
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
amount they donate in response to a change in the 
after-tax price of giving.1 The change in contribu-
tions was calculated by applying a tax price elasticity 
to existing contributions using the applicable change 
in the after-tax price of giving.2 That price was esti-
mated by calculating marginal tax rates on charitable 
giving from each individual record in CBO’s income 
tax model under 2006 law and under each policy 
option. For example, under an option that would 
extend the deduction for charitable contributions to 
nonitemizers, a taxpayer in the 25 percent bracket 
who claimed a standard deduction would see his or 
her tax price of giving fall from $1 per dollar of giving 
to 75 cents per dollar of giving, a 25 percent decline. 
Because empirical evidence about the responsiveness 
of taxpayers’ charitable contributions to their tax 
treatment is inconclusive, CBO calculated the results 
using alternative elasticity values (0 and -1.0) in addi-
tion to the main value (-0.5) used in the analysis. In 
addition, CBO examined the sensitivity of the results 
to the assumption that a certain amount of contribu-
tions—such as regular donations to religious organi-
zations—would be made regardless of changes in 
their after-tax price. CBO also explored the potential 
effects of taxpayers’ shifting donations into different 
years to increase the tax subsidies they receive. (See 
the appendix for those additional analyses.)
Estimating Differences in Effects by 
Income Level
CBO assessed the distributional implications of the 
policy options by comparing tax subsidy rates (the tax 
subsidy divided by adjusted gross income) for various 
income groups under a given option and under 2006 
law. In 2006, subsidy rates ranged from 0.12 percent 
for taxpayers with adjusted gross income under 
$50,000 to 0.96 percent for taxpayers with income 
above $500,000 (see the figure above). Subsidy rates 
rise with income because higher-income taxpayers are 
more likely to itemize deductions and because the 
after-tax price of giving declines as the marginal 
income tax rate increases with income.
Under 
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$100,000
$100,000 to
$200,000
$200,000 to
$500,000
Over 
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0
0.2
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1. This analysis reflects only the change in the relative price of 
charitable contributions. The change in the income tax treat-
ment of charitable contributions would also affect taxpayers’ 
after-tax income. Those income effects are likely to be small, 
however, because charitable contributions average only about 
2 percent to 3 percent of a taxpayer’s income (see Figure 2 on 
page 4). 
2. The tax price elasticity for charitable giving is the ratio of the 
percentage change in giving to the percentage change in its 
after-tax price. For example, a price elasticity of -0.5 means 
that a 1 percent increase in the after-tax price of giving 
reduces donations by 0.5 percent.
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Table 4.
Sources of Changes in Tax Subsidies Under Eleven Policy Options, 2006
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: The simulation results are for tax year 2006, and all figures are at 2006 levels. The total tax subsidy under 2006 law was $40.9 billion.
$500/$1,000 = $500 for individual filers and $1,000 for joint filers; * = between zero and $50 million; AGI = adjusted gross income.
who itemize deductions and donate less than the floor 
would no longer have a tax incentive for those dona-
tions.22 Overall, donations would be reduced by $0.5 bil-
lion (or less than 1 percent), and the tax subsidy would be 
reduced by $5.5 billion (or 14 percent), from the levels 
associated with 2006 tax law (see Table 3 on page 10).
Like the fixed dollar floor, the percentage-of-income floor 
in Option 2 would make benefits to itemizers less gener-
ous than under current law and would not affect non-
itemizers. Low-income itemizers would be able to reach 
the minimum contribution level more easily with this 
type of floor than with the fixed dollar floor. Although 
more middle- and high-income itemizers would see their 
after-tax price of giving increase, incentives for large 
contributors would be virtually unchanged. Under this 
option, donations would fall by $3.0 billion (or 2 per-
cent) and the tax subsidy would be reduced by $15.7 bil-
lion (or 39 percent) from the 2006 levels. Almost all of 
the added revenues in Options 1 and 2 would come from 
eliminating the tax subsidy for contributions below the 
level of the floor by taxpayers who continued to itemize 
their deductions (see Table 4).
Adding either a fixed dollar floor or a percentage-of-
income floor to the current deduction would lower the 
tax subsidy rate—the total tax subsidy divided by total 
income—for all income groups. Higher-income tax-
payers would face a much higher threshold for deducting 
donations with the percentage-of-income floor than with 
the dollar floor. Thus, the change in the tax subsidy for 
higher-income taxpayers would differ significantly 
between the two options. For taxpayers with AGI over 
$500,000, for example, the dollar floor in Option 1 
Floor for 
Eligible 
Donations
Option 1 $500/$1,000 * 0 -0.1 -5.5 -5.5
Option 2 2 percent of AGI 0.1 0 -0.4 -15.4 -15.7
Option 3 No floor 0.5 3.2 1.6 0 5.2
Option 4 $500/$1,000 0.3 1.3 1.0 -5.0 -2.5
Option 5 2 percent of AGI 0.3 0.9 0.3 -14.7 -13.1
Nonrefundable Credit for All Filers
Option 6 No floor 0.8 4.7 2.5 -0.9 7.1
Option 7 $500/$1,000 0.5 1.9 1.7 -6.5 -2.4
Option 8 2 percent of AGI 0.6 1.5 0.9 -14.9 -11.9
Nonrefundable Credit for All Filers
Option 9 No floor -1.2 2.9 -0.3 -14.8 -13.3
Option 10 $500/$1,000 -1.2 1.1 -0.8 -18.2 -19.0
Option 11 2 percent of AGI -1.0 0.9 -1.3 -23.2 -24.6
Giving Nonitemizers Being Nonitemizers Itemizers Total
Keep Deduction Available 
Only to Itemizers but Add Floor
Extend Deduction to All Filers
Convert Deduction to 25 Percent  
Convert Deduction to 15 Percent  
Source of Change in Tax Subsidy (Billions of dollars)
Existing Existing Giving by Itemizers
Change in Giving by Who Switch to Who Remain 
Net
22. In addition, there may be some itemizers who have no tax liability 
under current law but would have tax liability under the option 
and would face a reduction in the after-tax price of giving. Those 
few itemizers would have an increased incentive to donate.
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would decrease their tax subsidy by just 0.02 percent 
of AGI, whereas the percentage-of-income floor in 
Option 2 would lower their tax subsidy by 0.28 percent 
of AGI (see Figure 5 on page 16).
Options 3 to 5: Deduction for All Taxpayers, 
With or Without a Floor 
Another approach that CBO examined would be to allow 
everyone who files an income tax return to deduct chari-
table contributions (subject to the rules that now apply to 
itemizers, as explained in Box 1 on page 2), under three 
variations: 
 Option 3 would have no floor on the amount of 
donations that could be deducted.23
 Option 4 would have the same fixed dollar floor as 
Option 1 ($500 for single filers and $1,000 for joint 
filers).
 Option 5 would have the same percentage-of-income 
floor as Option 2 (2 percent of AGI).
Under those options, some itemizers would be expected 
to become nonitemizers, because nonitemizers would be 
treated more favorably than under current law, whereas 
the tax treatment of itemizers would not change. Itemiz-
ers whose other itemized deductions totaled less than the 
standard deduction would generally benefit from taking 
the standard deduction and claiming the new nonitem-
ized charitable deduction as well. For those taxpayers, the 
sum of the standard deduction and the new deduction for 
charitable contributions would exceed the total itemized 
deductions they could have claimed under 2006 law.24 
Taxpayers making that change would not be expected to 
alter their giving, however, because itemization status 
would not affect their after-tax price of giving.25 The only 
group of taxpayers who would see their after-tax price of 
giving fall—and would possibly increase their charitable 
donations as a result—would be nonitemizers with posi-
tive tax liability, who could take advantage of the more 
broadly available deduction.26 
Extending the charitable deduction to nonitemizers 
without any contribution floor, as in Option 3, would 
increase donations by $2 billion (or 1 percent), CBO 
estimates (see Table 3 on page 10). The tax subsidy 
would increase by $5.2 billion (or 13 percent), of which 
$3.2 billion would go to subsidize existing contributions 
by nonitemizers (see Table 4). Another large piece of the 
increase in the tax subsidy, $1.6 billion, would result 
from itemizers’ choosing to take the standard deduction 
because it exceeded their noncharitable deductions.27 The 
net change in giving would account for only $0.5 billion 
of the increase in the total tax subsidy.
Combining a floor with a deduction for all taxpayers 
would produce tax savings for the government while 
having relatively small effects on total donations. With 
the fixed dollar floor in Option 4, total contributions
23. The President’s budgetary proposals for fiscal years 2002 through 
2005 included a charitable deduction for nonitemizers. Those 
proposals were more restrictive than the option analyzed here, 
which would allow nonitemizers to subtract all of their charitable 
contributions from their AGI (subject to the same restrictions as 
itemizers) in addition to claiming the standard deduction. See 
Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S. Government 
for those years; also see Congressional Budget Office, Budget 
Options (February 2007), Revenue Option 11, “Create an Above-
the-Line Deduction for Charitable Giving”; and Congressional 
Budget Office, Effects of Allowing Nonitemizers to Deduct Charita-
ble Contributions (December 2002).
24. Under the options considered here, the incentive to switch item-
ization status would not exist for taxpayers paying the individual 
alternative minimum tax (AMT), because the standard deduction 
is not allowed for taxpayers paying the AMT. (Fewer than 3 per-
cent of filers were subject to the AMT in 2006.) Also, the existing 
limit on itemized deductions for high-income taxpayers (those 
with AGI over $150,500 in 2006) could give some taxpayers an 
additional incentive to switch itemization status under options 
that would allow charitable deductions by nonitemizers, if that 
limit did not apply to deductions by nonitemizers. This analysis 
assumed that the limit would also apply to charitable deductions 
claimed by nonitemizers and therefore would not provide an 
additional incentive to change itemization status. 
25. That statement is based on the assumption that behavioral effects 
resulting from changes in income would be small. It also ignores 
the fact that a small percentage of taxpayers would move into a 
lower marginal tax bracket because of the change in itemization 
status. 
26. For that group, the after-tax price per dollar of giving would fall 
from $1 to [$1 x (1 - their marginal tax rate)]. For most of those 
taxpayers, the average and marginal price per dollar of giving 
would be the same. However, deducting charitable donations 
could move some taxpayers to a lower tax bracket, in which case 
their marginal price of giving would exceed their average price of 
giving. 
27. Under the options that would extend tax incentives to nonitemiz-
ers without adding a floor (Options 3, 6, and 9), roughly 10 per-
cent of itemizers would switch to the standard deduction, CBO 
estimates.
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Figure 5.
Changes in Tax Subsidies Under Eleven Policy Options, by Income Group, 2006
(Percentage of adjusted gross income)
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: The simulation results are for tax year 2006, and all figures are at 2006 levels. 
* = between -0.005 percent and 0.005 percent.
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would increase by $0.8 billion (or less than 1 percent), 
whereas the tax subsidy would decline by $2.5 billion 
(or 6 percent). The subsidy for taxpayers who continued 
to itemize their deductions would fall by $5.0 billion, but 
those savings would be partly offset by new tax subsidies 
of $1.3 billion for existing contributions by nonitemizers, 
$1.0 billion for former itemizers who claimed the stan-
dard deduction instead, and $0.3 billion for the net 
change in donations. 
With a floor set at 2 percent of AGI, as in Option 5, total 
contributions would decline by $1.9 billion (or nearly 
1 percent), and the total tax subsidy would drop by 
$13.1 billion (or 32 percent). The reduction in the tax 
subsidy from excluding itemizers’ charitable contribu-
tions below the floor would amount to $14.7 billion, 
almost triple the $5 billion in tax savings from the same 
source under the similar option with the dollar floor 
(Option 4). Those tax savings would be partly offset by 
new tax subsidies of $0.9 billion for existing contribu-
tions by nonitemizers, $0.3 billion for former itemizers 
who claimed the standard deduction instead, and 
$0.3 billion for the net change in giving. 
Low- and middle-income taxpayers would be the main 
beneficiaries of extending the charitable deduction to 
nonitemizers because they make up the bulk of people 
who do not itemize deductions. Option 3 would raise the 
tax subsidy by 0.12 percent of AGI for taxpayers with 
income below $50,000 and by 0.10 percent of AGI for 
those with income between $50,000 and $100,000 (see 
Figure 5 on page 16). Taxpayers with AGI above 
$100,000 would have a much smaller increase in their 
tax subsidy rate (0.02 percent for that group as a whole). 
Adding a floor to the deduction for all filers would still 
increase the subsidy for taxpayers with income under 
$50,000 but by a smaller amount: 0.03 percent of AGI 
under Option 4 and 0.02 percent under Option 5. As in 
the options to add a floor to the current deduction for 
itemizers, upper income groups would see a larger reduc-
tion in their tax subsidy with a percentage-of-income 
floor than with a fixed dollar floor. 
Options 6 to 8: Nonrefundable 25 Percent Credit for 
All Taxpayers, With or Without a Floor 
An alternative way to extend tax benefits for charitable 
giving to all filers would be to convert the current deduc-
tion into a nonrefundable tax credit equal to a percentage 
of a taxpayer’s contributions.28 The credit could be 
various sizes. In this set of options, CBO examined the 
effects of a credit equal to 25 percent of donations, with 
the same three variations used earlier: 
 Option 6 would have no floor that donations would 
have to exceed to qualify for the credit.
 Option 7 would have the same fixed dollar floor as 
Options 1 and 4 ($500 for individuals and $1,000 for 
joint filers).
 Option 8 would have the same percentage-of-income 
floor as Options 2 and 5 (2 percent of AGI).
Substituting a nonrefundable credit for the current 
deduction would provide the same subsidy (per dollar of 
giving) to all taxpayers who could fully claim the credit, 
instead of a subsidy rate that increases with a filer’s mar-
ginal tax rate. A 25 percent nonrefundable credit would 
tend to benefit lower- and middle-income taxpayers, who 
generally face marginal tax rates of less than 25 percent. 
Taxpayers facing tax rates above 25 percent would see a 
decrease in subsidies under this option. As a result, 
replacing the current deduction with a 25 percent credit 
would probably increase the share of total income taxes 
paid by higher-income people. 
Taxpayers would respond in several ways if the itemized 
deduction for charitable contributions was replaced with 
a nonrefundable tax credit. Current itemizers whose 
noncharitable deductions total less than the standard 
deduction would generally no longer choose to itemize. 
The after-tax price of giving would rise for itemizers 
facing marginal tax rates above 25 percent, creating an 
incentive for them to reduce contributions, whereas the 
after-tax price would fall for itemizers facing marginal tax 
rates below 25 percent, creating an incentive for them to 
increase contributions. Nonitemizers with positive tax lia-
bility would generally face a lower after-tax price of giving 
under this option and thus would also have an incentive 
to raise their contributions. The overall effect on dona-
tions would depend on whether the increased giving by 
people whose after-tax price of giving fell would exceed 
the decreased giving by people whose after-tax price rose. 
28. Nonrefundable tax credits are limited to the amount of a person’s 
tax liability before credits. Refundable credits, such as the earned 
income tax credit, can exceed tax liability before credits and result 
in a refund payment from the government to the taxpayer.
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CBO estimates that with a 25 percent credit and no 
floor (Option 6), total contributions would increase by 
$2.7 billion (or 1 percent)—about 35 percent more than 
the increase from extending the charitable deduction to 
all taxpayers without a floor (Option 3). The tax subsidy 
for charitable giving would rise by $7.1 billion (or 17 per-
cent), of which only $0.8 billion would result from the 
net change in donations. Most of the cost increase to the 
government ($4.7 billion) would come from subsidizing 
existing contributions by nonitemizers; another $2.5 bil-
lion would result from former itemizers who would 
choose to take the standard deduction (see Table 4 on 
page 14). Among taxpayers who continued to itemize 
deductions, the increased tax subsidy for those with mar-
ginal tax rates below 25 percent would be slightly less 
than the reduced subsidy for those with marginal rates 
above 25 percent, resulting in a net decrease of $0.9 bil-
lion in the tax subsidy for that group. 
If the credit applied only to contributions above the fixed 
dollar floor in Option 7, total donations would increase 
by $1.5 billion (or less than 1 percent), and the total tax 
subsidy would decline by $2.4 billion (or 6 percent). 
With the percentage-of-income floor in Option 8, total 
contributions would decrease by $1.0 billion (or less than 
1 percent), and the tax subsidy would drop by $11.9 bil-
lion (or 29 percent). Under both of those options, 
increases in the tax subsidy from existing donations and 
from the net change in giving would be outweighed by a 
reduction in the subsidy from excluding tax benefits for 
contributions below the floor.
A nonrefundable tax credit for charitable giving available 
to all filers would favor low- and middle-income taxpay-
ers even more than a deduction for all filers would. The 
reason is that the after-tax price of giving would be the 
same for all taxpayers rather than being lower for people 
with higher marginal income tax rates. 
Option 6 would increase the tax subsidy for people with 
income under $100,000 by approximately 0.3 percent 
of AGI and for people with income between $100,000 
and $200,000 by 0.02 percent of AGI (see Figure 5 on 
page 16). Taxpayers with AGI above $200,000 are likely 
to have marginal income tax rates greater than 25 per-
cent. Consequently, their tax subsidy would fall under 
Option 6—by 0.19 percent of AGI for taxpayers with 
income between $200,000 and $500,000 and by 
0.14 percent of AGI for those with income over 
$500,000.
Under the options that include a floor, the decrease in tax 
subsidy rates would be concentrated among taxpayers 
whose AGI was above $100,000. That decrease would 
equal 0.16 percent of AGI under Option 7 and 0.35 per-
cent of AGI under Option 8. For taxpayers with income 
below $100,000, by contrast, the tax subsidy would 
increase by approximately 0.1 percent of AGI under both 
options.
Options 9 to 11: Nonrefundable 15 Percent Credit 
for All Taxpayers, With or Without a Floor
The last three options in CBO’s analysis are similar to 
Options 6 to 8 but with a smaller credit. They would 
replace the current deduction with a tax credit equal to 
15 percent of a taxpayer’s donations, with the following 
differences: 
 Option 9 would have no floor.
 Option 10 would have the same fixed dollar floor as 
Options 1, 4, and 7 ($500 for individuals and $1,000 
for joint filers). 
 Option 11 would have the same percentage-of-income 
floor as Options 2, 5, and 8 (2 percent of AGI).
The size of a tax credit for charitable giving affects not 
just the magnitude but the direction of the effects. A 
15 percent credit with no floor would decrease donations 
relative to 2006 law (by $7.8 billion, or 4 percent), 
whereas a similar 25 percent credit would increase dona-
tions relative to 2006 law (by $2.7 billion, or 1 percent). 
Adding either type of floor to the 15 percent credit would 
reduce donations by slightly larger amounts—and, again, 
would result in fewer contributions than the comparable 
options with a 25 percent credit. In all three cases, total 
donations would be about 5 percent lower under the 
options with a 15 percent credit than under the analo-
gous options with a 25 percent credit because the smaller 
credit would provide smaller tax incentives for charitable 
giving. 
The same pattern would occur for the total tax subsidy, 
but the changes would be larger. With a 15 percent credit 
and no floor (Option 9), the tax subsidy would fall by 
$13.3 billion (or 33 percent) relative to 2006 law, 
whereas with a 25 percent credit and no floor, the tax 
subsidy would rise by $7.1 billion (or 17 percent). Add-
ing the $500/$1,000 floor (Option 10) would reduce the 
tax subsidy even more, by $19.0 billion (or 47 percent) 
OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE TAX TREATMENT OF CHARITABLE GIVING 19
CBO
relative to 2006 law, compared with a $2.4 billion reduc-
tion under the same fixed dollar floor and a 25 percent 
credit. With a floor equal to 2 percent of AGI (Option 
11), the 15 percent credit would reduce the tax subsidy 
by $24.6 billion (or 60 percent), compared with an 
$11.9 billion decrease under the comparable option with 
a 25 percent credit. Virtually all of the reduction in the 
subsidy would come from eliminating tax benefits for 
charitable contributions below the floor.
Relative to 2006 law, taxpayers with AGI under $50,000 
would see a small increase in their subsidy rate under all 
of the options with a 15 percent credit. That increase 
would equal 0.12 percent of AGI with the credit alone 
and 0.03 percent with the credit plus a floor. Taxpayers 
whose AGI was between $50,000 and $100,000 would 
see virtually no change in their subsidy rate with the 
15 percent credit alone but a decrease equal to 0.11 per-
cent of AGI with the fixed dollar floor or 0.15 percent of 
AGI with the percentage-of-income floor. All three vari-
ants of the 15 percent credit would decrease subsidy rates 
for income groups above $100,000, with the largest 
reductions in this analysis coming from combining that 
credit with a floor of 2 percent of AGI.

CBO
Appendix: 
Sensitivity Analyses
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) examined 
how sensitive the total amount of charitable contribu-
tions and the level of the tax subsidy are to several differ-
ent assumptions about the responsiveness of charitable 
donations to the after-tax price of giving. The sensitivity 
analyses involved assuming alternative elasticity values, 
assuming different responses for small amounts of dona-
tions, and allowing for the possibility of changes in the 
timing of donations. 
Alternative Elasticity Values 
In addition to the elasticity of -0.5 used in its base case, 
CBO estimated the effects of the policy options under 
two alternative assumptions—that charitable contribu-
tions do not change at all in response to changes in the 
after-tax price of giving (an elasticity of 0) and that they 
respond twice as strongly as assumed in the base case (an 
elasticity of -1.0). Although different assumptions about 
responsiveness result in different estimates of total giving 
and costs to the government (see Table A-1), the results 
are similar to those obtained with the base-case elasticity. 
For example, under Option 3 (a deduction for all taxpay-
ers), if the assumed elasticity was -1.0 instead of -0.5, the 
tax subsidy would increase by $5.8 billion relative to cur-
rent law rather than by $5.2 billion, and total charitable 
giving would increase by $4.4 billion rather than by $2.0 
billion. Alternatively, if taxpayers were assumed to have 
no response to changes in the after-tax price of giving, the 
tax subsidy would increase by $4.7 billion under Option 
3 instead of by $5.2 billion, and there would be no 
change in charitable giving. That pattern of results holds 
for the other options as well. 
Different Responses for Smaller 
Donation Amounts
In its main analysis, CBO assumed that all charitable 
contributions are sensitive to changes in the after-tax 
price of giving. However, taxpayers’ regular donations to 
churches and other religious organizations may be less 
price-responsive than other contributions. CBO exam-
ined an alternative in which the first $275 in donations 
by individuals and the first $550 by joint filers are 
assumed not to be responsive to the price of giving. 
(Those amounts are based on average contributions to 
religious organizations by lower-income taxpayers, 
according to CBO’s analysis of 2003 data from the Uni-
versity of Michigan’s Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 
adjusted to 2006 levels.) 
With that alternative assumption, the change in total 
contributions by taxpayers under most options is slightly 
smaller than in the base case because some portion of 
giving is not responsive to a change in the after-tax price. 
The net effect on giving under each option, however, 
depends on whether a smaller increase in donations by 
people whose after-tax price of giving falls exceeds a 
smaller decrease in donations by people whose after-tax 
price rises. The net change in contributions is small in 
every option because, in the aggregate, the amounts of 
giving assumed to be fixed represent less than one-quarter 
of total contributions. The alternative assumption pro-
duces almost no difference in the change in the tax sub-
sidy under any of the options relative to the base case (see 
Table A-2 on page 24). 
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Table A-1. 
Effects of Policy Options Under Alternative Assumptions About the 
Price Elasticity of Charitable Giving, 2006
Continued
203.0 n.a. n.a. 40.9 n.a. n.a.
Elasticity of 0 (Not responsive) 203.0 0 0 35.3 -5.6 -13.6
Elasticity of -0.5 202.5 -0.5 -0.2 35.4 -5.5 -13.5
Elasticity of -1.0 202.1 -0.9 -0.4 35.4 -5.5 -13.5
Elasticity of 0 (Not responsive) 203.0 0 0 25.1 -15.8 -38.7
Elasticity of -0.5 200.0 -3.0 -1.5 25.2 -15.7 -38.5
Elasticity of -1.0 197.4 -5.6 -2.7 25.2 -15.7 -38.3
Option 3—Deduction for 
Elasticity of 0 (Not responsive) 203.0 0 0 45.6 4.7 11.5
Elasticity of -0.5 205.0 2.0 1.0 46.1 5.2 12.8
Elasticity of -1.0 207.4 4.4 2.2 46.7 5.8 14.3
Option 4—Deduction for 
Elasticity of 0 (Not responsive) 203.0 0 0 38.2 -2.7 -6.7
Elasticity of -0.5 203.8 0.8 0.4 38.4 -2.5 -6.1
Elasticity of -1.0 204.9 1.9 0.9 38.7 -2.2 -5.4
Option 5—Deduction for 
Elasticity of 0 (Not responsive) 203.0 0 0 27.5 -13.4 -32.8
Elasticity of -0.5 201.1 -1.9 -0.9 27.8 -13.1 -32.1
Elasticity of -1.0 199.9 -3.1 -1.5 28.0 -12.9 -31.5
Option 6—25 Percent Tax Credit for 
Elasticity of 0 (Not responsive) 203.0 0 0 47.2 6.3 15.5
Elasticity of -0.5 205.7 2.7 1.3 48.0 7.1 17.4
Elasticity of -1.0 209.3 6.3 3.1 49.0 8.1 19.7
Option 7—25 Percent Tax Credit for 
Elasticity of 0 (Not responsive) 203.0 0 0 38.0 -2.9 -7.1
Elasticity of -0.5 204.5 1.5 0.7 38.5 -2.4 -5.8
Elasticity of -1.0 206.7 3.7 1.8 39.3 -1.6 -4.0
Itemizers with 2 Percent of AGI Floor
All Taxpayers with No Floor 
All Taxpayers with $500/$1,000 Floor 
All Taxpayers with 2 Percent of AGI Floor
All Taxpayers with No Floor 
All Taxpayers with $500/$1,000 Floor
Option 2—Deduction for 
2006 dollars) Dollars Percent 2006 dollars)
Current Law
Deduction for Itemizers with No Floor 
Options to Change Current Law
Option 1—Deduction for 
Itemizers with $500/$1,000 Floor 
Dollars Percent
Contributions Current-Law Level Tax Subsidy Current-Law Level
(Billions of Billions of (Billions of Billions of
Change in Total Change in
Total Contributions from Tax Subsidy from
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Table A-1. Continued
Effects of Policy Options Under Alternative Assumptions About the 
Price Elasticity of Charitable Giving, 2006
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: The analysis described in the main text of this report used an elasticity of -0.5 (meaning that a 1 percent increase in the price of giving 
would reduce donations by 0.5 percent).
The simulation results are for tax year 2006, and all figures are at 2006 levels. 
n.a. = not applicable; $500/$1,000 = $500 for individual filers and $1,000 for joint filers; AGI = adjusted gross income.
Possible Retiming of Giving 
Policy options that allow tax benefits only for donations 
in excess of a floor create an incentive for taxpayers to 
retime their giving so it is bunched into fewer years. For 
example, a family that typically donates $3,000 each year 
and faces a floor of $1,000 could increase its tax subsidy 
by instead donating $6,000 one year and nothing the 
next year. With $3,000 in annual donations, the family 
would have $2,000 above the floor in each year. But by 
giving the same total amount in alternating years, the 
family would have $5,000 above the floor in the year in 
which it made the contributions, or $2,500 averaged over 
the two years—making an additional $500 of its two- 
year contributions eligible for a tax subsidy. 
The estimates in CBO’s main analysis assumed no shift in 
the timing of contributions between years. CBO recalcu-
lated the changes in total giving and in the tax subsidy, 
averaged over two years, for selected options under the 
assumption that each taxpayer gives the same average 
annual amount but bunches his or her donations in alter-
nate years. That assumption significantly reduces the tax 
savings from the options involving a floor. For example,
Option 8—25 Percent Tax Credit for 
Elasticity of 0 (Not responsive) 203.0 0 0 28.4 -12.5 -30.6
Elasticity of -0.5 202.0 -1.0 -0.5 29.0 -11.9 -29.2
Elasticity of -1.0 202.0 -1.0 -0.5 29.7 -11.2 -27.4
Option 9—15 Percent Tax Credit for 
Elasticity of 0 (Not responsive) 203.0 0 0 28.7 -12.2 -29.8
Elasticity of -0.5 195.2 -7.8 -3.9 27.6 -13.3 -32.6
Elasticity of -1.0 188.4 -14.6 -7.2 26.6 -14.3 -35.1
Option 10—15 Percent Tax Credit for 
Elasticity of 0 (Not responsive) 203.0 0 0 23.1 -17.8 -43.5
Elasticity of -0.5 194.4 -8.6 -4.2 21.9 -19.0 -46.5
Elasticity of -1.0 186.9 -16.1 -7.9 20.8 -20.1 -49.1
Option 11—15 Percent Tax Credit for 
Elasticity of 0 (Not responsive) 203.0 0 0 17.3 -23.6 -57.6
Elasticity of -0.5 193.0 -10.0 -4.9 16.3 -24.6 -60.1
Elasticity of -1.0 184.4 -18.6 -9.1 15.4 -25.5 -62.3
Percent
Options to Change Current Law (Continued)
All Taxpayers with 2 Percent of AGI Floor
All Taxpayers with No Floor 
All Taxpayers with $500/$1,000 Floor
All Taxpayers with 2 Percent of AGI Floor
(Billions of Billions (Billions of Billions
2006 dollars) of Dollars Percent 2006 dollars) of Dollars
Contributions Current-Law Level Tax Subsidy Current-Law Level
Change in Total Change in
Total Contributions from Tax Subsidy from
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Table A-2. 
Effects of Policy Options Under Alternative Assumptions About Whether a 
Minimum Amount of Donations Is Unresponsive to Changes in the 
After-Tax Price of Giving, 2006
Continued
203.0 n.a. n.a. 40.9 n.a. n.a.
No minimum 202.5 -0.5 -0.2 35.4 -5.5 -13.5
Minimum of $275/$550 203.0 * * 35.4 -5.5 -13.5
No minimum 200.0 -3.0 -1.5 25.2 -15.7 -38.5
Minimum of $275/$550 200.9 -2.1 -1.0 25.2 -15.7 -38.5
Option 3—Deduction for 
No minimum 205.0 2.0 1.0 46.1 5.2 12.8
Minimum of $275/$550 204.2 1.2 0.6 45.9 5.0 12.3
No minimum 203.8 0.8 0.4 38.4 -2.5 -6.1
Minimum of $275/$550 203.9 0.9 0.5 38.4 -2.5 -6.2
No minimum 201.1 -1.9 -0.9 27.8 -13.1 -32.1
Minimum of $275/$550 201.8 -1.2 -0.6 27.7 -13.2 -32.2
No minimum 205.7 2.7 1.3 48.0 7.1 17.4
Minimum of $275/$550 204.2 1.2 0.6 47.6 6.7 16.4
No minimum 204.5 1.5 0.7 38.5 -2.4 -5.8
Minimum of $275/$550 204.2 1.2 0.6 38.4 -2.5 -6.2
No minimum 202.0 -1.0 -0.5 29.0 -11.9 -29.2
Minimum of $275/$550 202.2 -0.8 -0.4 28.8 -12.1 -29.6
Change in Total Change in
Total Contributions from Tax Subsidy from
Percent
Contributions Current-Law Level Tax Subsidy Current-Law Level
(Billions of Billions of (Billions of Billions of
2006 dollars) Dollars Percent 2006 dollars) Dollars
All Taxpayers with 2 Percent of AGI Floor
Current Law
Deduction for Itemizers with No Floor 
Options to Change Current Law
Option 1—Deduction for 
Itemizers with $500/$1,000 Floor 
Option 2—Deduction for 
Itemizers with 2 Percent of AGI Floor
All Taxpayers with No Floor 
Option 4—Deduction for 
All Taxpayers with $500/$1,000 Floor 
Option 5—Deduction for 
Option 6—25 Percent Tax Credit for 
All Taxpayers with No Floor 
Option 7—25 Percent Tax Credit for 
All Taxpayers with $500/$1,000 Floor
Option 8—25 Percent Tax Credit for 
All Taxpayers with 2 Percent of AGI Floor
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Table A-2. Continued
Effects of Policy Options Under Alternative Assumptions About Whether a 
Minimum Amount of Donations Is Unresponsive to Changes in the 
After-Tax Price of Giving, 2006
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: The analysis described in the main text of this report used the “no minimum” assumption (meaning that a taxpayer’s entire donations 
would change in response to a change in the after-tax price of giving).
The simulation results are for tax year 2006, and all figures are at 2006 levels. 
n.a. = not applicable; $500/$1,000 = $500 for individual filers and $1,000 for joint filers; $275/$550 = $275 for individual filers and 
$550 for joint filers; * = between -0.05 and zero; AGI = adjusted gross income.
under Option 5 (a deduction for all taxpayers and a floor 
equal to 2 percent of adjusted gross income), if taxpayers 
bunched contributions in alternate years, the annual tax 
savings would be $6.4 billion rather than $13.1 billion 
(see Table A-3). At the same time, charitable giving 
would increase by $0.3 billion rather than dropping by 
$1.9 billion. Under Option 8 (a 25 percent tax credit 
with the same percentage-of-income floor), annual tax 
savings would be $4.9 billion rather than $11.9 billion, 
and annual charitable contributions would increase by 
$1.2 billion instead of declining by $1.0 billion. Even 
with the assumption that taxpayers bunch contributions 
in alternate years, the conclusion that a floor can notice-
ably reduce the total tax subsidy, with relatively modest 
effects on giving, still holds.
The results of this sensitivity analysis are consistent with 
the results that would occur with no bunching behavior 
but with a floor half as big as the one examined (1 per-
cent of adjusted gross income instead of 2 percent). In 
other words, by giving every other year, taxpayers could 
effectively cut the annual floor in half. Taxpayers could 
further decrease the effectiveness of a floor by limiting 
their contributions to fewer years—for example, by giv-
ing every third year instead of every other year, which 
would effectively reduce the floor by two-thirds rather 
than by half. Certain factors, however—such as annual 
funding needs by organizations that receive donations—
might limit the extent to which taxpayers would want 
to accelerate or defer contributions between years in 
response to a floor on giving.
No minimum 195.2 -7.8 -3.9 27.6 -13.3 -32.6
Minimum of $275/$550 195.1 -7.9 -3.9 27.5 -13.4 -32.7
No minimum 194.4 -8.6 -4.2 21.9 -19.0 -46.5
Minimum of $275/$550 195.0 -8.0 -3.9 21.9 -19.0 -46.4
No minimum 193.0 -10.0 -4.9 16.3 -24.6 -60.1
Minimum of $275/$550 194.0 -9.0 -4.5 16.3 -24.6 -60.1
Contributions Current-Law Level Tax Subsidy Current-Law Level
Change in Total Change in
Total Contributions from Tax Subsidy from
All Taxpayers with $500/$1,000 Floor
(Billions of Billions (Billions of Billions 
2006 dollars) of Dollars Percent 2006 dollars) of Dollars Percent
Options to Change Current Law (Continued)
Option 9—15 Percent Tax Credit for 
All Taxpayers with No Floor 
Option 10—15 Percent Tax Credit for 
Option 11—15 Percent Tax Credit for 
All Taxpayers with 2 Percent of AGI Floor
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Table A-3. 
Effects of Selected Policy Options Under Alternative Assumptions About Whether 
Taxpayers Retime Donations in Response to a Contribution Floor, 2006
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: The analysis described in the main text of this report assumed no retiming of contributions between years. The alternative assumption 
shown here, that taxpayers bunch contributions in alternate years, means that donors give two years’ worth of contributions every 
other year to increase the amount that qualifies for a tax preference.
The simulation results are for tax year 2006, and all figures are at 2006 levels. 
n.a. = not applicable; AGI = adjusted gross income.
Deduction for Itemizers with No Floor 203.0 n.a. n.a. 40.9 n.a. n.a.
Option 5—Deduction for All Taxpayers with 
No retiming of contributions 201.1 -1.9 -0.9 27.8 -13.1 -32.1
Contributions bunched in alternate years 203.3 0.3 0.1 34.5 -6.4 -15.7
Option 8—25 Percent Tax Credit for 
No retiming of contributions 202.0 -1.0 -0.5 29.0 -11.9 -29.2
Contributions bunched in alternate years 204.2 1.2 0.6 36.0 -4.9 -12.0
Current Law
Options to Change Current Law
2 Percent of AGI Floor
All Taxpayers with 2 Percent of AGI Floor
2006 dollars) Dollars Percent 2006 dollars) Dollars Percent
Contributions Current-Law Level Tax Subsidy Current-Law Level
(Billions of Billions of (Billions of Billions of
Change in Total Change in
Total Contributions from Tax Subsidy from
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Options for Changing the 
Tax Treatment of Charitable Giving
Under current law, taxpayers who itemize deduc-
tions may deduct the amount they donate to charities 
from their adjusted gross income (AGI) when determin-
ing how much they owe in federal income taxes. That 
deduction gives people who itemize an incentive to con-
tribute to charities. Like other forms of preferential tax 
treatment, the deduction also costs the federal govern-
ment revenues that it might otherwise collect. At current 
levels of charitable giving, the cost of that deduction—
measured as the additional revenues that could be col-
lected if the deduction was eliminated—will total about 
$230 billion between 2010 and 2014, according to the 
Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT).1 
Numerous proposals have been made in recent years to 
alter the income tax treatment of charitable giving by 
individual donors. Some proposals aim to reduce the 
cost to the government by imposing a floor (or minimum 
level) that a person’s charitable giving would have to 
exceed to qualify for preferential tax treatment. Other 
proposals would extend the current charitable deduction 
to taxpayers who do not itemize deductions or would 
replace the current deduction with a nonrefundable tax 
credit available to all taxpayers who make charitable 
contributions.2 
For this analysis, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
examined how much taxpayers in various income groups 
donate to charities and what types of organizations 
receive those donations. CBO also investigated how 
changing the structure of tax incentives for giving would 
affect the tax subsidy (the cost in forgone revenues to 
the federal government), the overall level of charitable 
giving, and the extent to which different income groups 
benefit from the tax preference. Specifically, CBO looked 
at 11 options for altering the current income tax treat-
ment of charitable giving, which can be grouped into 
4 categories: 
 Retaining the current deduction for itemizers but 
adding a floor. 
 Allowing all taxpayers to claim the deduction, with or 
without a floor. 
 Replacing the deduction with a nonrefundable credit 
for all taxpayers, equal to 25 percent of a taxpayer’s 
charitable donations, with or without a floor. 
 Replacing the deduction with a nonrefundable credit 
for all taxpayers, equal to 15 percent of a taxpayer’s 
charitable donations, with or without a floor. 
For each of the four categories, CBO analyzed two 
potential floors: a fixed dollar amount ($500 for single 
taxpayers and $1,000 for couples filing a joint return) 
and a percentage of income (2 percent of AGI). Only 
contributions in excess of the floor would be deductible 
or eligible for a credit. The analysis uses data for 2006, 
the most recent year for which the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice’s public-use sample of individual income tax returns 
is available. The tax treatment of charitable contributions 
is generally the same today as it was in 2006; however, 
1. A deduction for charitable contributions also exists under the cor-
porate income tax. JCT estimates a much smaller five-year cost for 
that deduction: about $17 billion. See Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2010–
2014, JCS-3-10 (December 15, 2010), www.jct.gov/publications 
.html?func=startdown&id=3718. 
2. Taxpayers can use tax credits to reduce their income tax liability 
(the amount they owe). Nonrefundable credits can lower income 
tax liability to zero, but excess credits cannot be used to increase 
tax refunds. In contrast, refundable credits that exceed income tax 
liability are paid to taxpayers as refunds.
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because of rising incomes and contribution amounts, the 
options that include a fixed dollar floor would have a 
somewhat different impact today than presented here.
Effects of Policy Options on Tax 
Subsidies and Charitable Donations
According to CBO’s modeling, adding a contribution 
floor to any of the approaches listed above would reduce 
both the total federal tax subsidy and the total amount 
donated to charity, relative to the same option without a 
floor. In each case that CBO examined, the reduction in 
the subsidy (and thus the increase in revenues) would 
exceed the reduction in charitable contributions, whether 
measured in dollars or as a percentage change. The reason 
is that introducing a floor would continue to provide a 
tax incentive for additional giving above the level of the 
floor and at the same time reduce the tax subsidy for 
donations that people might have made even without a 
tax incentive.3 
Allowing all taxpayers to claim a deduction for charitable 
giving would have increased donations in 2006 by an 
estimated $2.0 billion (or 1 percent) and increased the 
total tax subsidy by $5.2 billion (or 13 percent) from the 
2006 amounts. Combining a deduction for all taxpayers 
with a floor, however, could both increase donations and 
decrease the tax subsidy. For example, such a deduction 
combined with a fixed dollar floor of $500/$1,000 would 
have increased donations by $800 million in 2006 and 
decreased the tax subsidy by $2.5 billion (see Summary 
Table 1).
Replacing the current deduction with a 25 percent tax 
credit would increase donations and also increase the gov-
ernment’s forgone revenues. Combining such a credit 
with certain contribution floors, however, could boost 
donations while reducing the tax subsidy or could 
decrease donations by a small percentage while reducing 
the tax subsidy by a large percentage. Setting the credit at 
15 percent would reduce donations but would reduce the 
tax subsidy by a larger amount (both in dollars and as a 
percentage change). 
Effects of Policy Options on 
Various Income Groups
Changing the tax treatment of charitable contributions 
would have differing effects on taxpayers at different 
points on the income scale. Adding a contribution floor 
to the current deduction for itemizers would reduce tax 
subsidies for all income groups, but for high-income 
taxpayers, the size of the reduction would vary signifi-
cantly depending on the type of floor used. For instance, 
augmenting the deduction with a fixed dollar floor of 
$500/$1,000 in 2006 would have lowered the tax subsidy 
for people with AGI over $100,000 by 0.08 percent of 
their AGI, whereas adding a floor equal to 2 percent of 
AGI would have lowered the tax subsidy for that income 
group by 0.30 percent of their AGI. 
Making the deduction for charitable contributions avail-
able to nonitemizers would benefit lower- and middle-
income taxpayers, who tend not to itemize deductions 
because their deductible expenses (such as mortgage 
interest and state and local taxes, as well as charitable 
donations) are not large enough to exceed the standard 
deduction. Those groups would benefit even more if the 
current deduction—which tends to help higher-income 
taxpayers more because they face higher tax rates—was 
replaced with a nonrefundable credit that gave all income 
groups the same tax incentives for giving. For example, 
replacing the deduction with a 25 percent credit in 2006 
would have increased the tax subsidy for taxpayers with 
AGI below $100,000 by 0.27 percent of their AGI, but it 
would have decreased the tax subsidy for people above 
that income level by 0.09 percent of AGI. Tax subsidies 
would be lower for all income groups with a 15 percent 
credit than with a 25 percent credit.
Caveats About This Analysis
The results of CBO’s policy simulations are meant to 
highlight the general effects of the various approaches. 
The exact size of those effects, however, would depend on 
the specific parameters of a policy—such as the level of 
the floor or the amount of the credit—as well as on the 
extent to which taxpayers would change the amount of 
their charitable giving in response to a change in the tax 
subsidy. In addition, this analysis does not reflect many of 
the other ways in which taxpayers might respond to a 
change in their tax subsidy, such as shifting donations 
between years. (In the appendix, CBO examines how 
sensitive the results of this study are to several different 
assumptions, including variations in taxpayers’ respon-
siveness to changes in their tax subsidy and the possibility 
of shifts in the timing of donations.)
3. The fact that some nonitemizers contribute to charities despite 
receiving no tax benefits for doing so suggests that a substantial 
amount of charitable giving would still occur in the absence of a 
tax incentive.
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Summary Table 1.
Summary of Total Donations and Tax Subsidies Under Current Law and 
Eleven Policy Options, 2006
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: The simulation results are for tax year 2006, and all figures are at 2006 levels. 
$500/$1,000 = $500 for individual filers and $1,000 for joint filers; AGI = adjusted gross income.
Floor for
Eligible Donations
No floor 203.0 40.9
$500/$1,000 -0.5 -5.5
2 percent of AGI -3.0 -15.7
No floor 2.0 5.2
$500/$1,000 0.8 -2.5
2 percent of AGI -1.9 -13.1
No floor 2.7 7.1
$500/$1,000 1.5 -2.4
2 percent of AGI -1.0 -11.9
No floor -7.8 -13.3
$500/$1,000 -8.6 -19.0
2 percent of AGI -10.0 -24.6
Add Floor
Total Contributions Tax Subsidy
(Billions of (Billions of 
2006 dollars) 2006 dollars)
Current Law
Deduction Available Only to Itemizers
Change from Current Law
Keep Deduction Available Only to Itemizers but
Convert Deduction to 15 Percent Nonrefundable 
Option 1
Option 2
Extend Deduction to All Filers
Option 3
Option 4
Option 5
Convert Deduction to 25 Percent Nonrefundable 
Credit for All Filers
Option 6
Option 7
Option 8
Credit for All Filers
Option 9
Option 10
Option 11
http://cbo.gov/publication/42185  
 
Options for Changing the Tax Treatment of 
Charitable Giving 
 
The deductibility of charitable donations has been a feature of the U.S. individual income tax 
almost as long as the modern income tax has been in existence. Although the deduction 
encourages charitable giving, like other forms of preferential tax treatment, it results in loss 
revenue to the federal government. At current levels of charitable giving, the cost of that 
deduction—measured as the additional revenues that could be collected if the deduction was 
eliminated—will total about $230 billion between 2010 and 2014, according to the Joint 
Committee on Taxation. 
At the request of the House Budget Committee, CBO released a study today entitled Options for 
Changing the Tax Treatment of Charitable Giving. The study examines patterns of individual 
charitable giving and analyzes how options for changing the tax treatment of such giving might 
affect the overall amount of donations, the costs to the federal government, and the distribution 
of tax benefits among different income groups. 
CBO’s Analysis 
Under current law, taxpayers who itemize deductions may deduct the amount they donate to 
charities from their adjusted gross income (AGI) when determining how much they owe in 
federal income taxes. CBO looked at 11 options for altering that approach to the treatment of 
charitable giving, which can be grouped into four categories: 
 Retaining the current deduction for itemizers but adding a floor—a minimum amount that 
a person’s charitable giving would have to exceed to qualify for preferential tax 
treatment. 
 Allowing all taxpayers, not just those who itemize, to claim the deduction, with or 
without a floor. 
 Replacing the deduction with a nonrefundable credit for all taxpayers, equal to 25 percent 
of a taxpayer’s charitable donations, with or without a floor.  
 Replacing the deduction with a nonrefundable credit for all taxpayers, equal to 15 percent 
of a taxpayer’s charitable donations, with or without a floor. 
For each of the four categories, CBO analyzed two potential floors: a fixed dollar amount ($500 
for single taxpayers and $1,000 for couples filing a joint return) and a percentage of income (2 
percent of AGI). Only contributions in excess of the floor would be deductible or eligible for a 
credit. 
General Effects of Options for Changing the Charitable Deduction 
CBO estimated what the budgetary impact of the policy options would have been in 2006, the 
most recent year for which the Internal Revenue Service’s public-use sample of individual 
income tax returns is available. In that year, contributions totaled $203 billion and the tax 
subsidy—the cost in forgone revenues to the federal government—was $40.9 billion.  As 
summarized in the following table CBO estimates that: 
 Adding a contribution floor to any of the approaches listed above would reduce both the 
tax subsidy and the total amount donated to charity, relative to the same option without a 
floor. In each case that CBO examined, the reduction in the subsidy—and thus the 
increase in revenues—would exceed the reduction in charitable contributions, whether 
measured in dollars or as a percentage change. The reason is that introducing a floor 
would continue to provide a tax incentive for additional giving above the floor while 
reducing the tax subsidy for donations that people might have made even without a tax 
incentive. 
 Allowing all taxpayers to claim a deduction for charitable giving would have increased 
donations in 2006 by an estimated $2.0 billion (or 1 percent) and increased the total tax 
subsidy in that year by $5.2 billion (or 13 percent). 
 Combining a deduction for all taxpayers with a floor, however, could both increase 
donations and decrease the tax subsidy. For example, such a deduction combined with a 
fixed dollar floor of $500/$1,000 would have increased donations by $800 million in 
2006 and decreased the tax subsidy by $2.5 billion. 
 Replacing the current deduction with a 25 percent tax credit would increase donations 
and also increase the tax subsidy. 
This analysis estimates the cost of the tax preference for charitable donations by focusing on the 
change in revenues directly attributable to the amount of charitable giving. That approach differs 
from the type of revenue estimates that are the responsibility of the staff of the Joint Committee 
on Taxation (JCT). JCT’s estimates would reflect many of the ways in which taxpayers might 
alter their behavior in response to the existence of the tax preference, such as changing the 
timing of donations between years and changing their tax compliance. The measure that CBO 
used does not reflect all of the behavioral assumptions that would be included in a revenue 
estimate; it accounts only for changes in the amount of charitable giving and any changes in the 
extent to which taxpayers itemize their deductions that would occur if the standard deduction 
was larger than a taxpayer’s noncharitable itemized deductions. 
The results of CBO’s policy simulations are meant to highlight the general effects of the various 
approaches. The exact size of those effects, however, would depend on the specific parameters of 
a policy—such as the level of the floor or the amount of the credit—as well as on the extent to 
which taxpayers would change the amount of their charitable giving in response to a change in 
the tax subsidy. 
Effects on Various Income Groups 
Changing the tax treatment of charitable contributions would have differing effects on taxpayers 
at different points on the income scale. Adding a contribution floor to the current deduction for 
itemizers would reduce tax subsidies for all income groups, but for high-income taxpayers, the 
size of the reduction would vary significantly depending on the type of floor used. For example, 
a floor equal to 2 percent of AGI would reduce subsidies by a greater amount than a fixed-dollar 
floor of $500/$1,000 in 2006. 
Making the deduction for charitable contributions available to non-itemizers would benefit 
lower- and middle-income taxpayers, who tend not to itemize deductions because their 
deductible expenses (such as mortgage interest and state and local taxes, as well as charitable 
donations) are not large enough to exceed the standard deduction. Those groups would benefit 
even more if the current deduction—which tends to help higher-income taxpayers more because 
they face higher tax rates—was replaced with a nonrefundable credit that gave all income groups 
the same tax incentives for giving. 
This study was prepared by Athiphat Muthitacharoen of CBO’s Tax Analysis Division, and Seth 
Giertz, formerly of CBO. 
 
